Abstract: Amongst the most seminal writers who influenced Freud’s thought is the one who for two years was his Professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna: Franz Brentano. The interlocution between Brentano’s philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis presents itself today as a really broad field of research, made feasible after the publication of the letters of youth exchanged between Freud and his friend Eduard Silberstein, thanks to which it was possible to affirm with significant degree of certainty the whole extent of Brentano’s influence on Freud’s work. The present work intends to be inserted in this field of investigations. We argue that it is from the Brentanian conception of the psychical phenomenon (psychische Phänomen) that Freud will sketch the broad frame of the psychic reality (psychische Realität) as “a special form of existence which should not be confused with material reality” (Freud, S. Die Traumdeutung, 1914, p. 480). Therefore, we propose to describe the Brentanian conception of intentionality present in the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) and to analyze the resonances of this concept in the Freudian theory of representation (Vorstellung). This theory, which reflects Brentano’s most fundamental thesis - the impossibility of an act of representation occurring in the absence of a
represented object - appears for the first time in the text Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. Eine kritische Studie (The Interpretation of Aphasia. A Critical Study) of 1891.

Keywords: Intentionality. Psychic phenomenon (psychisches Phänomen). Psychic reality (psychisches Realität). Representation (Vorstellung)

Brentano e Freud: intencionalidade e teoria representacional no “Zur Auffassung der Aphasien” (1891)

Resumo: Entre os autores que de maneira mais seminal influenciaram o pensamento de Freud encontra-se aquele que por dois anos foi seu professor de filosofia na Universidade de Viena: Franz Brentano. A interlocução entre a filosofia de Brentano e a psicanálise freudiana apresenta-se, atualmente, como um campo de pesquisa realmente amplo, viabilizado após a publicação das cartas de juventude trocadas entre Freud e seu amigo Eduard Silberstein, graças às quais foi possível afirmar com significativo grau de certeza toda a dimensão da influência de Brentano na obra freudiana. O presente trabalho pretende inserir-se neste campo de investigações. Sustentamos que é a partir da concepção brentaniana do fenômeno psíquico (psychische Phänomen) que Freud desenhará o amplo quadro da realidade psíquica (psychische Realität) enquanto “forma especial de existência que não deve ser confundida com a realidade material” (Freud, S. Die Traumdeutung, 1914, p. 480). Para tanto, propomos descrever a concepção brentaniana da intencionalidade presente na Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) e analisar as ressonâncias de tal conceito na teoria freudiana da representação (Vorstellung) dos anos 1890. Esta, que reflete a tese mais fundamental de Brentano - a impossibilidade de um ato de representação ocorrer na ausência de objeto representado - aparece pela primeira vez no texto Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. Eine kritische Studie (A Interpretação das Afásias. Um Estudo Crítico), de 1891.


INTRODUCTION

Amongst the most seminal authors who influenced Freud’s thought is the one who for two years was his Professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna: Franz Brentano (1838-1917). The interlocution between Brentano’s philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis presents itself today as a thought-provoking field
of research. It became feasible only after the publication of the letters of youth exchanged between Freud and his friend Eduard Silberstein, thanks to which it was possible to affirm - with a certain degree of certainty - the whole dimension of Brentano’s influence in the Freudian work. Until then, there had been little more than the paradoxical account of Maria Dorer in his *Historichen Grundlagen der Psychanalyse* (published in 1932), which, even without consulting Freud himself (who was still alive and active in the year of publication of that work), concluded that it was impossible to prove any direct relations between Freud and Brentano other than “purely personal in character” (MERLAN, 1945, p. 375); or the misunderstanding of Ernest Jones, for whom Freud would have taken only one “passing glance” (JONES, 1953, p. 41) in Brentano’s seminars during his time at the University of Vienna. In fact, Freud’s “glance” at the philosopher’s classes consisted of attending for four academic semesters all the courses offered by Brentano between the winter of 1874 and the summer semester of 1876 – only philosophical and non-mandatory courses attended by Freud, since the University no longer demanded, since 1873, the attendance of medical students to philosophical courses (Merlan, apud CATALDOMARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 36; COHEN, 2002, pp. 90, 99-100).

**CORRESPONDENCE WITH SILBERSTEIN**

In any case, it was the access to the letters sent by Freud to his friend Silberstein in the period between 1871-1881 which made it possible to review many of the inaccuracies regarding his period as a medical student. Among them, it problematized the so-called “strictly personal relationship” between Brentano and Freud, supposedly devoid of any implications in the latter’s thinking, as well as the common notion that Freud would be obstinately refractory to philosophy.

The first mention Freud gives to Brentano in correspondence dates from 30 October 1874:

(...) in Brentano’s lectures we all meet again. Brentano is doing two lectures, on Wednesday and Saturday nights, selected metaphysical questions, and on Fridays at

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4. At the request of Philip Merlan, Victor Kraft of the University of Vienna, made a survey of the Brentano’s courses attended by Freud. They are: “Readings of Philosophical Texts”, in its third (winter of 1874/1875), fourth (summer of 1875) and fifth semesters (winter of 1875/1876); “Logic” in its fourth semester and, in the sixth (summer of 1876), “Philosophy of Aristotle”.
night, a paper by Mill on the principle of utility, which we regularly attend (FREUD, 1995, p. 86).

This passage is valuable because it reveals the importance of Brentano in Freud’s contact with the work of Stuart Mill. Already in the first semester as a student of Brentano, the work of Stuart Mill was in the center of the attentions of Freud at least once a week. In fact, when one seeks to clarify Freud’s relation to philosophy in this period, the names of Brentano and Stuart Mill are the most commonly found - although they are not the only ones: Filip Geerardyn and Gertrudis van de Vijver, for example, show the influence of Wilhelm Jerusalem on the conception of the Project for a scientific psychology of 1895 (hereinforward called, Project).

The correspondence with Silberstein shows that Freud’s much-discussed repulsion of what he calls “philosophy” does not mean the rejection of the whole of the discipline, but rather the echo of Brentano’s rejection of the speculative metaphysics of Hegel, Schelling and Fichte. Brentano, who considered himself a natural scientist to work objectively with the experience as his guide, insisted that the method of philosophy should be identified with that of natural science and, according to Lindenfeld (apud CATALDO-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p.36), had taken upon himself the task of saving the philosophy of the frank decline to which it was subjected because of the “excessive speculative orientation of the Hegelians.” A committed Empiricist, he believed that he could rise to the absolute and self-evident truths of theology and metaphysics from the experience and through careful observation and rigorously grounded inductions. The brilliance, clarity, logical rigor, seriousness, and competence with which he moved between seemingly antagonistic domains - from the most radical and scientific empiricism to the most devout Catholicism - not only crowded his lectures but also drew the attention of Freud - which, far from considering him a speculative metaphysician, saw in him a “remarkable man (...), Darwinian (...), even genial” (FREUD, 1995, p. 5).

5. In addition to the work of Stuart Mill, in the third semester of Freud’s medical school he studied “selected metaphysical questions” presented in lectures that happened twice a week. About them, he writes to Silberstein: “One of them treats - listen and amaze! - of the existence of God, since Professor Brentano, who presents them, is a splendid person, a scholar and a philosopher, although he finds it necessary to sustain the diaphanous existence of God with his opinions “(FREUD, 1995, p. November 8, 1874). The reference to this trait of Brentano is recurrent in Freud’s letters.


7. In a letter of January 30, 1927 addressed to Werner Achelis, the psychoanalyst says he believes “that metaphysics will one day be seen as a nuisance, as a misuse of thought, as a survival from the period of religious world view, and it will be judged thus” (Freud, apud COHEN, 2002, p. 90).

8. Letter to Silberstein on March 7th 1875.
115). In fact, Brentano inspired in his pupils a lasting devotion to the “truth” and to the philosophy - as well as to his own charismatic figure (Cohen 2002: 89).

Thus, academic records and correspondence with Silberstein allow us to realize that Freud’s interest in Brentano was much more consistent than hitherto admitted by his biographers. Between the winter of 1874 and the end of the summer semester of 1876, Freud attended to Brentano’s seminars three or more times during the week. His interest in Feuerbach appeared in Brentano’s courses, during which he began the study of psychology. From Stuart-Mill’s study in his master’s classes, Freud was introduced to psychology long before he graduated in medicine or from interning with Charcot (1885-1886). Under his influence, he had even reviewed the resolute materialism with which he identified himself in 1875, canceled a season he would spend in Berlin studying with the exponents of that school, and made mention of a doctorate in philosophy:

For now, the novelty of having matured, especially under the current influence of Brentano, the decision to obtain my doctorate of philosophy based on philosophy and zoology; other discussions are in progress to promote my entrance to the Faculty of Philosophy, or next semester, or the next year” (Freud, 1995, p. 115).

Not even the mistrust “greater than ever” in relation to philosophy”10 (id. p. 148) who had confessed to his friend after a trip to England (from late July to early September 1875) to visit his half-brother, Emanuel, prevented him from enrolling in the course offered by Brentano in 1876 entitled “The Philosophy of Aristotle “. Nevertheless, it is also true that the correspondence with Silberstein provides evidence of Freud’s ambivalent position on philosophy and on the master himself.

In any case, we share the opinion of Aviva Cohen that there is ample evidence that “Brentano’s philosophical and psychological teachings had a significant impact of Freud’s theoretical development” (COHEN, 2002, p. 89).

In fact, Freud soon realized that he could not explain neurotic disorders - in particular hysteria - nor by his neurophysiological record alone (for which hysteria had long been seen as concealment and deception), nor by his “purely” psychological dimension (Freud realized this by seeing that hypnosis, rather than exhausting the manifestation of hysteria, dislocated its symptomatology); nevertheless, he found in Brentano elements necessary for the articulation between the psychological and the physiological which, expressed more forcefully in his “pre-psychoanalytic” writings, permeate all his work in the unfoldings he performs in the concept of drive. We argue that it is from the Brentanian conception of the *psychic fenomenom* (*psychische Phänomen*) that Freud will sketch the broad frame of the *psychic reality* (*psychische Realität*), in which the drive operates as a “limit concept” between the

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9. Id.

10. Letter to Silberstein on September 9th 1875.
soul and the somatic (FREUD, 1915/2004, p. 148) – which does not imply postulating an identity between the two notions. It is thanks to the contact with Brentanian psychology that Freud can affirm, in the Traumdeutung, that “psychic reality is a special form of existence that should not be confused with reality material”\(^{11}\) (FREUD, 1900a/1991, p. 607). We propose, in this work, to describe the Brentanian conception of intentionality as it appears in the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* of 1874 (hereinafter, *Psychologie*) - Brentano’s work that most presents resonances in Freud’s initial thinking - and to analyze the resonances of such a concept in Freud’s theory of representation (*Vorstellung*). This one, which reflects Brentano’s most fundamental thesis - the impossibility of an act of representation occurring in the absence of a represented object - appears for the first time in the text *Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. Eine kritische Studie*\(^{12}\), of 1891 (hereinafter, *Aphasia*).

**INTENTIONALITY, PRINCIPLE OF DEMARCATION OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA**

After his habilitation to teaching with the *Habilitationsschrift* called *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*\(^{13}\) (University of Würzburg, 1867), Brentano began to work around the foundations of psychology. This research resulted, among others, the *Psychologie*. One of its most important principles was that philosophy is void without recourse to the method of the natural sciences - a principle which is reflected in its empirical approach to psychology. For him, there would be no other valid scientific method but the positivist method. However, his use of the term “empirical” is very different from the present one: Brentano emphasized that all our knowledge should be based on direct experience, not in the form of a theory described in third person, but in a form of introspection: psychology from an empirical point of view means, for him, to *describe what one experiences directly in the inner perception, in a theory described in first person.*

Brentano distinguished between genetic psychology and empirical or descriptive psychology - distinction that is thematized in his *Descriptive Psychology* (1982). The former studies psychological phenomena from a third-person point of view, using empirical tools. The second - which is sometimes called phenomenology (BRENTANO, 2002, p. 137s) – is intended to describe the awareness of a first-person viewpoint; it aims to list fully “the basic components out of which everything

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\(^{11}\)“(D)ie psychische Realität eine besondere Existenzform ist, welche mit der faktischen Realität nicht verwechselt werden soll” (FREUD, 1900b/1914, p. 480).

\(^{12}\)Leipzig/Viena: Franz Duticke, 1891.

\(^{13}\)Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos. Mainz: Verlag Franz Kirchheim, 1867.
internally perceived by humans is composed” and list “the ways in which these components can be connected” (BRENTANO, 1982/2002, p. 2). His main objective was to lay the foundations for a scientific psychology, defined by him as “the science of psychic phenomena” 14 (BRENTANO, 1874, p. 25). Contrary to what Heaton asserts (1981, p. 163), it is an empirical psychology and not a “soul science” with metaphysical commitments. Defining Brentanian psychology as “the science of the soul,” Heaton says that Brentano saw in the soul a substance that has sensations - perceptual images and fantasies, acts of memory, expectancy or fear, desire or aversion; by substance, an entity in which other things subsist but which, itself, subsists in nothing, “the ultimate subject.” Nothing further from the philosopher’s ideal of empirical psychology. The ontological status of extra-mental objects or of the mind itself is not, in Brentano’s thought, the subject of a scientific psychology, but rather the relations between phenomena - which is why he chooses psychic phenomena as the object of his psychology. And to avoid constructing a psychology on the assumption of a substance, Brentano takes up the Aristotelian distinction between act and potency and develops a philosophy of the psychic. By recoursing to Aristotle, he recovers a definition of soul that characterizes it as an act that is directed at an object that exists only intentionally. Reality translates into act, in opposition to the potency that the correlates have to be or not existent; hence the act Wirklichkeit, reality. Only the psychic phenomena are real, since the intentional acts are real. Intentional correlates have another ontological nature, regardless of whether they exist in themselves beyond phenomena.

At Psychologie, he proposes six criteria to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, of which we highlight two:

(i) **Psychic phenomena are the exclusive object of inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung).** Psychic phenomena, argues Brentano, “are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible” (BRENTANO, 1874, p. 118; BRENTANO, 2009, p. 70). According to him, the innere Wahrnehmung (which is the only form of perception in the strict sense) provides evidence of what is properly true15 due to its immediacy and greater evidence in relation to the external, sensory experience. However, internal perception should not be confused with internal observation; that is, it should not be conceived as “a full-fledged act accompanying another mental act toward which it is directed” (HUEMER, 2010, p. 5). Rather, it is intertwined with internal observation, that is: in addition to being primarily directed at an object, each act is incidentally directed at itself as a secondary object - the subject’s consciousness of being involved in a cognitive process. As in the evidence of the Cartesian cogito, I can question the truth or falsity of an object of thought, although I can not doubt the fact of

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14. “Wissenschaft von der psychische Phänenomenen”.
15. Huemer (2010, p.5) notes that the German word for perception, Wahrnehmung, literally means „taking-true“. 
thinking. Therefore there would be no unconscious mental acts, only mental acts of different degrees of intensity; moreover, the degree of intensity with which the object is represented is equal to the degree of intensity with which the secondary object - that is, the act itself - is represented.

(ii) Psychic phenomena are always intentionally directed to an object. The intentionality is the original notion recovered by Brentano in contemporary philosophy. Its classical formulation - although ambiguous - is present in the Psychologie:

> Every mental phenomenon (psychische Phänomen) is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental [mentale]16) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt), direction toward an object (Kichtung auf ein Object) ((which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing [eine Realität]), or immanent objectivity (immanente Gegenständlichkeit) (BRENTANO, 1874/2009, p. 68).

For the medieval Scholastics (of which Brentano takes up the notion), the term “intentional inexistence” is locative rather than negative, that is, it aims to characterize a specific modality of existence - existence to something or to someone (CATALDO-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 39). In Thomistic philosophy, the intentio (that through which one knows something, a species through which one knows something intellectually) enabled the preservation of the essence in the intellectual representation, even though its existence was no longer physical, but psychic - in a typical moderated realism. The preservation of essence in mental representation protected the realism of knowledge. Both the application of the spirit to an object of knowledge and the very content of the thought to which the spirit applies; taken over by Brentano, intentionality becomes the principle of demarcation of psychic phenomena (KRIEGEL, 2017, p. 100). Huemer (2010, p. 6) points out that, despite the ambiguity of the definition present in Psychologie, Brentano’s purpose was to work...
out a **ultimate criterion of distinction** between mental and physical phenomena, and not develop a systematic approach to intentionality. Thus, it is psychic that phenomenon characterized by **intentional in-existence** of its object or, what is the same, that mental act that has its correlate or whose object is intentionally existent. That is why we read, in the *Psychologie*: “Nothing distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena more than the fact that something is immanent as an object in them” (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 152).

Therefore, at *Psychologie*, the definition of psychic phenomena highlights its exclusive property in the face of physical phenomena: the latter have spatial location as property, while psychic phenomena possess the property of the (intentional) inexistence of its object and are immediately apprehended in the inner perception. The examples of physical phenomena to which Brentano refers are those of exact sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology), such as color and sound. For him, the internal perception of the objects referenced by the direct complement of verbs such as see, hear, smell etc. is, as a mental act, a psychic phenomenon. And there is no psychic phenomenon other than a relation between an act and a content of the act. This is intentionality: the proper relation of the act that represents an object that does not exist intentionally in itself.

What, then, is the psychic phenomenon? Brentano presents it as a **mental act** defined by a verb (see, hear, smell, etc.) characterized by possessing a correlate – this is, the intentionally existent object “what should not be understood (...) as meaning a thing” (“eine Realität”); in other words, an inexistent object. With this the philosopher redefines the concept de representation (*Vorstellung*)17: this one is an act that refers to an inexistent correlate, a fundamental psychic phenomenon characterized by the intentional inexistence of the object. Amidst the modern philosophical tradition, which tended to emphasize the content of representations, Brentano emphasizes their effective, actual character; for him, *Vorstellung* refers not to “that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation” (BRENTANO, 1874/2009, p. 60). And both the act of representing and the object represented are independent of the real existence of things (*Realitäten*), which do not imply the acceptance of the idealist thesis that denies the existence of the external object to consciousness: faithful to the Aristotelian tradition, Brentano describes *Vorstellung* not just as a reproduction of the external object, but as a whole formed by the relation that the *Vorstellungen* establish between them.

17 The adopted English edition translates *Vorstellung* by *presentation* and, more rarely, *idea* or *thought*; vorgestellt, in turn, is expressed by one of the variations of *to think of* - from the German verb vorstellen (Linda McAlister, apud BRENTANO, 2009, p. xxi). In the Brentano translation history other alternatives have been used to shed *Vorstellung*, such as *representation* and *contemplation* (KRIEGEL, 2017, p.102). The Routledge edition option accentuates the representational mode of the *Vorstellung* phenomenon: it is a psychic phenomenon characterized by the “neutral” in-existence, we would say, of its intentional correlate, present to the mind as the most basic foundation or class of states of judgment or interest. Aware that other translations are possible and that the meanings of the German word vary in Brentano and Freud, we chose to translate *Vorstellung*, here, by *representation*. 
The intentional object to which we are directed is then a “divisive,” a non-independent part of the psychic phenomenon. This is why Brentano attaches to the definition of intentionality the representational modes in which the mind is directed to its objects: after all, “For this reason it is easy to understand that the fundamental differences in the way something exists in them as an object constitute the principal class differences among mental phenomena” (id., p. 152).

**FREUD’S THEORY OF REPRESENTATION IN “ZUR AUFFASSUNG DER APHASIEN”**

Brentano’s thesis of intentionality underlines the difference between psychic phenomena and physical phenomena and serves as the principle of demarcation of the former. It prays that every mental act contains its object in its interior, although there are different ways in which the act can be directed to its immanent object. The philosopher argues that we are immediately certain of the reality of an inner perception, whereas our knowledge of external realities is, as a perception of sensible qualities, obtained through secondary mechanisms.

_Mental representations_ are not just reproductions of external objects; on the contrary, representation is the only thing endowed with reality, since it refers exclusively to the _act of representing_. That is, there is no reality in the contents of consciousness, but only in the _activity_ of consciousness. The representation is then the act by which the object is intentionally present in the mind, independently of the extra-mental existence of the thing to which the representation refers. Its meaning stems not from the represented thing, but from the relation established between the representations (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p 57). This becomes particularly noticeable from Meinong’s criticism. The first Brentanian theory of intentionality (prior to the turning point of 1905) assumed that, in addition to _Wirklichkeit_ of acts of conscience there would also be the _Realität_ of things, to whose subjects the mental acts could or would not refer; in both cases, the directionality of consciousness to an object, regardless of its material existence or not, remained real.18

As the basic units of mental functioning, nothing can awaken _interest_ or be _judged_ (the two other fundamental classes of psychic phenomena described in

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18. Criticisms of the ontological status of the intentional object have made Brentano revise this assumption to the point of admitting that although the concrete individuals are the only ones endowed with existence, the evidence of the inner perception does not allow us, as far as knowledge is concerned, go beyond the phenomena as apprehended in acts of conscience. Hence the sense of the phenomenon or psychic act does not come from its veritative-correspondential potential, but from the relations established between the representations; or, in Garcia-Roza’s words (2008, p. 58-59), “there is meaning even when the representation does not have as reference a real object, existing in and of itself, as is the case, for example, of the centaur or winged horse”.
Psychologie) if it was not first represented to the mind; that is, each mental act contains the same object as the representation to which it is connected (BRENTANO, 2009, p. 156). There is no difference at the object, independent of the mental act (to love, to hate, to affirm or to deny) that it is directed to him. While the nature of the mental act may differ, the intentional object remains the same.

Thus, Brentano seems to have been the first author to free the psyche from the dependence of a physicalistic explanation. The psychic, for him, is a whole that is formed between parts without it being necessary to point out the cause or what determines it; these are phenomena whose meaning does not necessarily result from the articulation between mental representation and the represented thing, but from the articulation between the representations themselves. It is a mysterious whole, “original association” whose interdependent parts are not the serial effect of causes external to themselves nor can they be reduced to physiological processes.

Freud, at the time of the writing of Aphasia, rejected a serial ordering between physiology and psychology according to which the psychic phenomenon can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the physiological (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, page 55). For him, the chain of physiological processes is not in a mechanistic causal relationship with the psychic processes. Except for the metaphysical presuppositions of one and the other, for Brentano, as for Freud, the psychic phenomenon and the physiological phenomenon are different and irreducible to each other. The index of such difference is the intentional presence of the object in the psychic phenomenon.

Garcia-Roza maintains the importance of Brentano in the early days of psychoanalysis, claiming to be the author in philosophy capable of sponsoring the conception of object-representation (Objectvorstellung) as defended by Freud and lead him to describe the articulation between it and a word-representation (Wortvorstellung) in the production of meaning - which is always a linguistic meaning (ibid., p. 55, 59). Such notions are of fundamental importance in the Freudian corpus. They are already in Aphasia, where the concept of Objectvorstellung while a criticism of locationalism is expression of the presence of the Brentanism in Freud’s thought.

The main target of that text was the theory of the cerebral locations. The Meynertian reticularist locationism affirmed a point-to-point relation between stimuli coming from the external world and representations located in certain points of the cerebral cortex, in such a way that the representations corresponded to a projection of the elements of the periphery of the nervous system in the cortical tissue.

The idea was that a representation was the mechanical effect of peripheral stimulation, or more broadly, the idea that the psychological process is an epiphenomenon or a mechanical duplication of the physiological process (Garcia-Roza, apud CATALDO-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 39).
Such causality between physical and psychological phenomena, based on the description of the nervous system according to which bundles of fibers intercommunicated their different parts, was called into question by the observations of John Hughlings-Jackson; these made it appear that nerve fibers crossed different strata of brain tissue from the medulla to the cortex, in which certain ways of conducting the stimuli were closed, and different paths were initiated. This observation led Jackson to replace the idea of the location of brain functions in the cortex by the dynamic notion of processes that would involve various parts of the organ, or even the whole nervous system\textsuperscript{19}.

Responding to Charcot - for whom the functional injury responsible for the hysterical disorder would be located in the cortical tissue -, Freud affirms that the dynamic brain processes are always and necessarily globals; even in the case where there are material lesions in the nervous tissue, the resulting disorder is explained by a pattern of reaction of cortical activity to the functional disorganization caused by organic trauma, and not by the attribution, to the injured region, the role of basis of the lost or impaired function, as locationalism wanted (SIMANKE, 2005, p. 18). Influenced by him, Freud saw in hysteria a functional disturbance, that is, a disturbance that happens due to the impossibility of innervation of a certain circuit by the other cortical processes. It was already his intuition, from the time of his internship in the Salpêtrière, that the hysterical paralysis, given his precise location in the body, would be the result of a lesion in the conception of the affected organ - that is, that part of the body to which the name “arm”, “leg”, “hips”, etc., is commonly and conventionally attributed. In the article “Hysteria” (Freud, 1888/1991), Freud had already affirmed that the clinical observation evidenced changes that since their establishment exclude any suspicion of physical injury, which made him support the thesis that hysteria would represent a case of constitutional anomaly rather than an anatomically circumscribed disease. Revealed and undone by hypnosis the trauma that invested with affection the representation of the limb, paralysis tended to disappear or manifest in another organ.

In \textit{Aphasia}, when describing a theory about the language apparatus without any localizationist reference, Freud recours to two basic notions: it is by distinguishing

\textsuperscript{19} In this respect, the English neurologist (remembered mainly for his contributions in the study of epilepsy) postulated the existence of three levels in the organization of the nervous system: in the most basic, movements are represented in their less complex form, and the nervous centers responsible for they are located in the marrow; the intermediate level is located in the motor area of the cortex, and the highest levels in the prefrontal cortex. From Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Jackson states that certain epilepsy symptoms are cases of functional retrogression, that is: a disturbance that occurred at a higher level, which previously inhibited the functioning of the most basic centers, then manifests a negative symptom due to the lack of function of the first one. This explains, for example, the permanence of a pre-propositional emotional language, the significant use of simple expressions of very frequent use, such as “yes” and “no”, etc. Thus, while on the one hand Hughlings-Jackson retakes the functional paradigm applied to the centers or nervous areas - as Broca (1824-1880) -, on the other, explains the pathology from the idea of a generalized dynamic disorder in the nervous system.
between word-representation and object-representation that the psychoanalyst is able to deal with that other type of lesions postulated by Charcot, the purely functional ones - those in which the associative isolation, with the consequent impossibility of innervation of a certain cortical circuit, happens without a physical trauma, but only by the vicissitudes of the dynamic processes that constitute the cortical activity.

Freud further proposes that physiological and psychological processes would be dependent concomitants: “(the) psychic is... a process parallel to the physiological one (ein Parallelvorgang des Physiologischen), (a concomitant dependent) (FREUD, 1891, p 57; FREUD 1977, 56). There would be a kind of parallelism between the sensory and neurophysiological processes and the psychological processes, from whose interrelation and imbrication results the psychic reality. To suppose a correlation between the series did not imply admitting a mechanical causality; at the same time, Freud did not refuse the anatomical or depart from the neurological aspect, but maintained that there was no psychological scheme without a neurological scheme20. Freud thus excluded the mechanical causality of psychological processes, which were seen as effects of somatic processes.

The concomitance between somatic functions and psychic manifestations appears in the definition of object-representation present in Aphasia. The young doctor presents it as “an associative complex of the most diverse visual representations, acoustic, tactile, kinesthetic, etc.,” a definition that would have been learned from “philosophy”. Freud refers here to the philosophy of Stuart-Mill21; adds that the perception of a thing endowed with “properties” comes only from additional associations in the same chain, that is, “to the extent that in the range of the sensory impressions obtained by an object we also include the possibility of a long succession of new impressions in the the same associative chain” (FREUD, 1891, pp. 79-80, FREUD, 1977, p. 71).

20. For this purpose, the postulation of facilitated pathways between neurons producing associations between mnemonic traits and representations due to differences in the caliber of the neuron axis (FREUD, 1895/2003, p.177) and, on the other hand, the description of the Ego as an associative complex (formed by facilitated ways) capable of disturbing excitatory flows and moderating the primary processes in spite of such organic dispositions (id., p. 204).
21. In a note (FREUD, 1977, p. 71, note 27), he cites chapter III, Book I of A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843) and An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1861). In a letter to Eduard Silberstein of 22 and 23 October 1874, Freud mentions Brentano’s lecture on Utilitarianism of Mill. In another letter, dated March 15, 1875, he writes that Brentano recommends to his students the reading of Locke and Hume, and also that he speaks of the latter as the most exemplary of philosophers. Brentano had just published his Psychologie, in which he also examines the psychology of Hamilton and the Mills. In 1875, when Freud was taking Brentano’s psychology course, both discussed the laws of idea association of both Mills, father and son. Freud was thus well informed about the general lines of this particular associationist tradition and about Mill’s clashes with the conceptual current, and borrows from Stuart-Mill a kind of psychological phenomena in which, instead of describing the mental facts in search of the more primitive ones, one should examine their modes of production in order not to incur the error of taking as simple the composite representation whose production processes were lost. Along with the psychological analysis, Freud also presupposes that association laws based on the phenomena.
At that point, in *Aphasia*, Freud discusses the idea that the word acquires meaning by being linked to an object-representation. With regard to the representational theory that Freud elaborates on *Aphasia*, the main contribution of Stuart-Mill consists in the open character of the object-representation. Interested in unraveling the psychology of the concept of substance, the philosopher describes the object as the fruit of the present sensations as well as of an enormous number of possibilities of sensations that form the associative series of the object complex. This is why, in the Freudian text of 1891, the object-representation, compared to the word-representation, constitutes an open associative complex.

Freud does not deny the existence of impressions, but rather the idea that ideas are reproduction of impressions - an accent typical of the empiricists who advocate a kind of “mental mechanics”. The psychoanalyst thus elaborates a distinct and irreducible representational theory (even to Brentano’s): he rejects the conception of representation as the mechanical effect of external stimulation or as a mental reproduction of the external object, refers it to its neural basis and presents it as a construction whose meaning would derive from the relation that the various representations maintain among themselves. To realize this implies solving many difficulties usually identified in metapsychology - namely, those concerning the status of the unconscious system and the primary process.

This is why, according to Garcia-Roza (2008, p. 63), the best translation would be *Objectvorstellung* by object-representation, and not by *representation of object*, because it is not a referential reproduction of the external object, but a totality whose meaning is relational and which includes elements of different orders - that is, the neuronal substrate and its conscious and unconscious psychological manifestations.

The basic units of representations are what the psychoanalyst will come to name *mnemic traits* associated with each other. Through them, a representation would be linked to others, forming the network of representations that make up the psyche.

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22. In the neuropsychology that Freud previously developed to *Traumdeutung* there is a tendency to identify as unconscious those processes, mechanisms, and representations that take place in the brain tissue or the nervous system in their entirety. This is how we read, in the 1888 article on hysteria: “(...) hysteria is an anomaly of the nervous system, resting on a diverse distribution of excitations, probably forming a surplus of excitation within the soul organ. Its symptomatology shows that this surplus is distributed on conscious or unconscious representations” (FREUD, 1888/1992, p. 62-63, our griffin).

23. Present for example, in the French version of the text, made by Claude van Reeth. Refusing the biologicist tone of psychoanalysis he translates the terms into *représentation de mot* and *représentation d’object*, respectively. See FREUD, S. *Contribution à la conception des aphasies. Une étude critique*. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 127s.

24. The notion used by Freud throughout his work to designate the way stimuli are inscribed in memory, deposited in the various systems (unconscious, preconscious and conscious). In the 1895 *Project*, it designates the smallest associative unit registered in the cortical tissue through a facilitation (Bahning) - that is, between a facilitation and a sensitive image recorded in cortical tissue.
Thus, the representations would be formed by the association between the so-called object-associations (Object-Associationen) and word-representations (Wortvorstellungen). The first are an open associative set formed by images that will give rise to the object-representation. To form an object-representation, such associated images are linked to the word-representation through its sensorial ends – this means, the acoustic image of the word representation is linked to the visual image of the object-representation (FREUD, 1977, p 72). It is from this connection that the object-representation gains unity and identity, and the word representation, in turn, acquires meaning.

The object-representation therefore designates the meaning of the word-representation. This one, in turn, is a “closed complex of representations” (FREUD, 1891, p. 79; FREUD, 1977, p. 71) formed by several simple representations - such as the acoustic image of the word, its motor image, image of reading and writing. Their association is only possible because of the relationship between a language apparatus and another language apparatus. It is a transitive relation in which the word acquires meaning by its connection with the object-representation at the same time that the represented object acquires identity when articulated to the word-representation, and it is this articulation that allows the formation of the concept. Thus in Freud the objects of perception constitute independently of a conscious judicial act (consciousness is, in Freud, only a quality of the psychic, not its total expression). Put another way, the object-representation designates precisely the (open) set of the unconscious system in that it is tributary to nervous biology.

In Freud, as in Brentano, it is necessary that an act of representation occurs in the presence of a represented object, which does not imply that the represented object exists as a thing independent of thought. Although the external thing provides the sensory stimuli that will constitute the raw material of the object-representation, the representation is not representation of the external thing (eine Realität); after all, although it obtains its sensitive elements from the thing in the passivity of the sensibility, the object only constitutes itself as such in its connection with the word. To assert that the word representation acquires its signification by the connection with the object-representation is to affirm, as Brentano, that the meaning results from the articulation among representations, and not from the articulation between the representation and the extra-mental entity. Hence, just as the centaur may be inexistent (i.e., existent under intentional mode) in the neutral relation of the mental act which is the Vorstellung, the word representation can refer to multiple object representations whose meaning is rather expressive than judicial. In this way, intentionality sheds light on the affective status Freud attributes to the representation of the sexual object: it is capable of triggering all the dynamics of endogenous summation in the absence of an object external to the psychic apparatus. Put another way, the symbolic relation is a “precondition for the establishment of the sign,”
and the relationship between word-representation and object-representation allows
the language apparatus to produce original objects according to “particular object
associations” - signs which, because they are generated by the apparatus itself, are arbitrary (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 64).

Thus, as Cataldo-Maria and Winograd write, “representations overlap one
another, and in this process, the associative complex not only expands, but reorganizes and
acquires new characteristics” (CATALOG-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 40). Meaning, as effect of the connections between representations, presupposes
that the properties of complex representations do not consist merely of the sum
of the properties of “simple” representations, for “new properties emerge from
associations between representations” (ibid. p. 41). Freud gives representational
associations a description analogous to chemical synthesis, in which one can not infer
the characteristics of complex representation from the analysis of their component
elements taken in isolation. This way:

(...) representation is a mental construct in which sensory information is reorganized
successively throughout its capture of the external world and its treatment in the
pathways of the nervous system and the psychic apparatus (that is, it is not only
what is passively grasped of the external world) (id., ibid.).

This is the original meaning of Freud’s representational theory: it is not,
as in localizationism, a point-to-point mirroring in consciousness of sensory
impressions from the periphery of the nervous system; nor is it the question of
the induction of principles of association between ideas whose mechanism would
come from the objective relation between representations within consciousness.
Before, we are faced with an organization always open to new arrangements,
established between associated representations in the cortical tissue whose material
is the visual, acoustic and kinaesthetic images of internal or external origin coming
from the periphery of the nervous system - that is, from the sensitive experience.
What Freud does here is to ascribe to the neuronal apparatus the representative
capacity which the modern tradition ascribed only to consciousness (cogitatio).
In this way, he expands the concept of psychism, including unconscious cortical
representations, that is, complex associations between images of visual, acoustic
or kinaesthetic origin registered in the cortical tissue that, if on the one hand they
make sense when connecting to a word-representation, on the other hand it keeps
open the possibilities of recombination, which gives a remarkable plasticity to the
representation.

To assert, as Brentano, that representation is a psychic phenomenon that
intentionally contains its inexistent object does not refer us to a consciousness
that constitutes the object according to its own categories (Kant), whether it
exists (Descartes), is real (Husserl) or negative (Sartre); rather, it indicates that representation takes place in an act, and that the source of the stability and identity of representations is not indirect and abstract, but experiential, effective, not separate.

It is thus understood that the conscious is “the correlate of a process that represents the last stage in the reorganization of sensory information” (id. ibid.). The stages of construction of our representations are not themselves conscious, and our access to the stimuli coming from the external world occurs indirectly, mediated by this processual reorganization that takes place in the nervous system and in the psychic apparatus. With this, it seems clear that the Brentanian notion of representation contributed, if not to the construction of the theoretical body of psychoanalysis as a whole, at least for the concept of representation that underlies it.

BEYOND THE INTENTIONALITY, STUART-MILL

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Freud credits John Stuart-Mill with the philosophical inspiration of such a thesis. Garcia-Roza, followed by Cataldo-Maria and Winograd, points this credit, albeit indirectly, towards Brentano, because of the clarification that the philosophy of this author can provide in the understanding of the articulation between word-representation and object-representation in the production of meaning (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 59; CATALOG-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 42). In any case, it is Brentano’s merit to have introduced Freud to Stuart-Mill’s philosophy.

Specifically, the influence of the English philosopher is felt in Freud’s statement that “(...) in the range of sensory impressions obtained by an object we also include the possibility of a long succession of new impressions in the same associative chain” (FREUD, 1977, p. 71). To understand it, we must consider two aspects.

First, contrary to the “mechanical” conception of his father, James Mill - for whom the association of ideas was a simple combination of elements kept unchanged in the whole formed by them - John Stuart-Mill proposes, concerning the association between representations, what he calls “mental chemistry” (STUART-MILL, 1872, p. 441). According to him, the associative set resulting from the combined elements is not a simple sum of these elements, but a product generated from them, whose properties are irreducible to the properties of the separate elements (as occurs with water in relation to its constituent elements)25. “These therefore are cases”, as written by Stuart-Mill, “of mental chemistry: in which it is proper to say that the simple ideas generate, rather than that they compose, the complex ones.” (id., p. 441-442).

25. See, above, Freud on the properties of complex representations.
Keeping the properties of the simple elements unchanged, the chemical conception of the mental allows an unlimited generation of new sets with new properties - which was not possible from a mechanistic perspective. By this, it seems to us that the English philosopher is sketching an emergentistic conception of the mental which finds resonances in the Project of Freud.

Secondly, we must consider the conception of matter of the English philosopher and his presence in the Freudian text. In *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy* – where he exposes the psychological theory of belief in an outside world - Stuart-Mill attributes to the human mind expectancy capacity, that is, the ability to form, after real sensations, the idea of possible sensations - those which, while not being felt in the present, may be felt under certain future conditions. For him, the affections of the mind - such as Brendanian Vorstellungen - are immediately known, give testimony of themselves, and mental states arise from the outset as models of security by bringing within them the belief in their own existence. Thus, the existence of external things is based on a belief of psychological origin. This allows the mind, from a single experience, to infer a range of analogous sensations, which is due to the fact that current sensations actually have less importance than the possibilities of sensations: the first, arising from the contact of the subject with the object, are transient; the second, which implies a prediction or expectation, can be permanent, in such a way that “would allow us to distinguish the sensations of matter” (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 52). Precisely, what he called matter were these permanent possibilities of sensations which, guaranteed by past experience, do not present themselves as isolated sensations, but as groups of sensations as the objects of the external world - which, for perception, always present themselves as sensible qualities. This was what Freud had in mind when he posited the possibility of long succession of new impressions in the same associative chain.

Thus the open character of the object-representation does not allow Freud’s representational theory to be (as in Frege, for example) the expression of an individual subjective impression whose truth value would derive from the semantic demonstration of its objective sense in view of an existent reference. The presentation of word representation as complex representation and object representation as associative complex means abandoning the concept of impression inherited from empiricism and, with it, from the compulsory articulation between psychological elements (ideas) and physiological elements (impressions) that makes ideas the reproduction of impressions and their association results in the automatic association of those. What is represented in Freud is not the eidetic effect of sensible impressions but different associative series on a complex and inseparable whole that mobilizes the somatic record as well as the conscious psychological manifestation. The conscious system, in Freud’s typical materialism, is a qualitative modulation of the unconscious system, and both systems make up the psychic. As we have
said, there is no “psychological scheme” without a “neurological scheme,” or as Garcia-Roza stresses, Freud’s psychological scheme “is a neurological scheme” (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 46).

**BY THE WAY OF CONCLUSION**

In his appropriation of the Brentanian philosophy of intentionality, Freud makes an interesting turn. If, as regards the content of the representation, it reveals his naturalistic and neurophysiological bias when affirming that the images that form the associations are registered in the nervous tissue, as for its referential character the psychoanalyst shows itself essentially Brentanian when affirming that the complex only acquires sense when the association of an acoustic image of the word-representation with the visual image of the object-representation. Thus, he stresses that neither the conscious system nor the unconscious system are merely passive in the reception of stimuli external to the psychic apparatus. Nor would activity be an exclusive prerogative of the conscious system; what happens, indeed, is that the object-associative complex only makes sense by connecting to a word-representation at the level of conscious discourse – topos where disorders are treated, and repressions and repressions are revealed. The organism, in the neuronal register or at the cerebral level, also organizes such associative complexes through the facilitation and connections described in 1895’s *Project* - facilitations and connections over which the Ego exerts activity disturbing excitatory dynamics. Activity and passivity characterize both systems, which affect each other: consciousness (not substance, but quality or property) represents, affirms, denies, loves, or hates objects whose material is provided by the sensibility, while it somatizes the meaning attributed to the represented object of desire, and blushes at the lifting of censorship in the failed act. The object of desire is a rearrangement of the sensory data according to the representative capacity of the individual. *Vorstellung*, by Freud, like that of Brentano, is not subtracted from the mediational experiential situation that this concrete individual experiences; is not a synthetic abstraction for an absolute consciousness, but an open and communicable representation between individuals. Freud’s re-elaborations on the theme of the drive throughout his work aim to respond to the problem of the status of the representational object in the context of the problematic psychic reality introduced through the contact with Brentano’s philosophy as well as to the somatic origin of intentional behavior. The postulation of a psychic reality “not to be confused with material reality” and whose organization, based on the sensibility of the organism, dispensed with the mechanical mirroring of external objects mediated by the bundles of fibers that communicated the endings of the nervous system with the brain tissue is still revolutionary. Thus it is possible to affirm with Barclay that regardless the metaphysical presuppositions of one and
the other, Brentano’s thesis of intentionality and Freudian representational theory manifest, as a principle, the primacy of the relational sense of representations and not their correspondentional function, as if the psychic phenomena were intended to reflect a structure inherent in the objects whose stimuli they receive. Both master and student are committed to describing the representational modes that structure our psychic phenomena.

REFERENCES


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